This criticism has a similar to theories (such as gauthiers) that untraceable individuals are stuck in a suboptimal social situation that is bad enough to motivate them to make concessions to each other for an agreement, but the reason for their inability to work together without a contract cannot continue to function after the contract has been concluded. One possible solution to this problem is: to argue that individuals will choose to cast themselves as a maximum as limited means of self-interest rather than ass(personal interests) maximizing, that is to say to retrain, not to think first of their own interest, but to throw themselves to respect their agreements, provided that they are in an environment of like-minded individuals (Gauthier 1986 , 160-166). But this solution has been considered dubious by many commentators (see Vallentyne 1991). According to Gauthier, the ideas articulated in Morals by Agreement began nearly 19 years before its publication, when, while he “buzzed after words to express the strange relationship between morality and advantage,” the footnote 1 showed him the prisoner`s dilemma. Although the traditional view interprets the solution of prisoners` dilemmas in favour of linear maximization, Gauthier saw the dilemma as a problem of practical rationality and cooperation. His project in Morals by Agreement was to create “a fair framework for moral behavior and principles,” footnote 2 – a kind of justification based on rational decision. Gauthier`s central assertion is that in situations where it is a matter of interacting with other individuals, “an individual chooses rationally only to the extent that he limits his search for his own self-interest or advantage, in order to respect principles that express the impartiality characteristic of morality.” Footnote 3 To meet the challenge he saw in the prisoner`s dilemma, Gauthier raised three major related issues. The first was the need to formulate the principles of rational cooperation (i.e. limited maximization). The second central problem concerned the need to demonstrate the rationality of compliance with the principle adopted.
Finally, the third problem was to “determine the appropriate starting position for further cooperation.” Footnote 4 In response to the three main problems, Gauthier has motivated to develop several central elements of his brand of contractarism. One such element is the idea that what economists call a totally free and competitive market is a morally free zone. Others include the fundamental principles for determining how to share the benefits of cooperation (i.e. the relative concession of minimumx and maxim of relative benefits), a developed conception of limited maximization and, finally, a (lockean) condition for defining the initial conditions from which an agreement can be negotiated fairly. Footnote 5 Part of what makes Gauthier`s approach unique is that it fundamentally breaks with the dominant point of the social contract developed by John Rawls. Although Gauthier admits that Rawls`s idea – that the principles of justice are the subject of a rational choice” footnote 6 – is part of his own theory, there are still important differences. In particular, Gauthier insists that his theory purports to “produce morality as a set of rational principles for election”; He accepts his task to show “why an individual who argues for non-moral premises would accept the constraints of morality in his choice.” Footnote 7 This theory contrasts with Rawls` plan to define the common principles of justice, which are agreed by a fair starting negotiating position behind the veil of ignorance and whose two principles of justice act as constraints for social institutions.